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Abstract 
This article discusses the various ways the Kurdish women’s 
movement has impacted feminism in the Turkish context. Against 
the background of the problematic historical relationship between 
Turkish and Kurdish women’s rights activists, we will explore the 
shift in perceptions of, attitudes towards and relations of feminists in 
Turkey with the Kurdish women’s movement. Our article will show 
that a “new generation of feminists” in Turkey appreciates and is 
inspired by the Kurdish women’s movement, and rejects the 
Kemalist and nationalist undertones of earlier generations. Without 
wanting to belittle on-going nationalism and the rise of women 
cadres linked to the authoritarian Turkish regime, our article 
analyses the various ways the intersectional long-term struggle of 
Kurdish women is being perceived, recognised as well as critically 
engaged with by many Turkish feminist activists. 
 
Introduction 
Any observer of international women’s day demonstrations in Istanbul would be impressed and 
moved by the sight of “intersectional feminist politics” in action.  Over the past years, large 8 
March demonstrations have involved thousands of women of different generations shouting 
slogans against gender-based violence, in support of LGBTQ rights and, crucially, also against 
state violence and repression, particularly of the Kurdish population. Feminist activists have 
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been singing and shouting slogans, carrying colourful banners and creative signs in both 
Turkish and Kurdish as they are marching from İstiklal Street in Beyoğlu towards Gezi Park at 
Taksim square, the centre of the 2013 anti-government protests. Occasionally, the peaceful 
protests turn violent, when, as for example, in 2014, riot police prevented the feminist activists 
to enter the square. Even during the height of political repression in 2017 and 2018, when hardly 
any overt opposition was possible, feminists in Turkey defied the odds, and, in daring and 
extremely brave acts, protested against state repression, increased authoritarianism as well as 
the specific crack-down on Kurdish towns, activists and politicians. 
Yet only a decade ago, Turkish and Kurdish women’s rights activism in Turkey was deeply 
divided along ethnic and political lines, with limited cooperation around gender-based 
violence.2 Despite the critique of Kemalism as patriarchal and authoritarian by the more radical 
and autonomous Turkish feminist organizations that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
specific plights of and challenges for Kurdish women’s rights activists were largely ignored or 
dismissed by third wave Turkish feminists.3 A number of authors have convincingly illustrated 
the various ways that Turkish feminists initially reproduced Kemalist modernizing discourses 
and later on, while being critical of Kemalism, continued to ignore or dismiss the specific 
plights of Kurdish women.4 
Meanwhile, since the 1980s, Kurdish women’s rights activists have been highlighting not 
only their marginalization and oppression within Kurdish society and within the political 
movement, but have also been very critical of Turkish feminists’ complicity with the 
authoritarian and nationalist Turkish state. Marginalised and estranged by the Kemalist 
modernization project, 5  Kurdish women became initially politicized in leftist movements 
during the 1960s and 70s, followed by larger scale mobilization through the Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK) in the second half of the 1980s and throughout 
the 1990s.6 Their involvement as “sexless militants”7 and political activists for the Kurdish 
nationalist cause involved side-lining gender-based forms of inequalities and discriminations. 
Kurdish feminist organizations emerged both as a reaction to patriarchal structures within 
Kurdish society and political organizations, as well as marginalization and lack of recognition 
within the Turkish feminist movement.8 
It is against this historical background that the contemporary feminist movement in Turkey 
is remarkable for its intersectional character. Especially young feminists have shifted from 
earlier nationalist perspectives, recognizing not only the plurality of women’s experiences 
within Turkey, but also the various ways different power configurations based on gender, 
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ethnicity, sexuality and class intersect. This generation is influenced by transnational feminist 
politics and solidarities that recognise the connection of struggles of marginalized and 
oppressed peoples, for example with feminist organizations and campaigns in neighbouring 
countries.9 All generations of Turkish feminists increasingly credit their Kurdish counter-parts 
for their critique of authoritarian and nationalist politics and their radical approaches against 
gender-based violence. Yet, tensions and differences persist amongst and within both Kurdish 
and Turkish feminist organizations.  
In this article, we will explore different trajectories, perceptions and political positions of 
feminists in Turkey who have been working to address issues of diversity, inclusivity and 
cooperation between Turkish and Kurdish feminists. The existing literature on the relationship 
between Turkish and Kurdish women’s rights activism stresses that, during the past decades, 
political spaces for collaboration and collective action opened up during more peaceful times, 
while increased tensions and outward conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdish 
movement have created tensions and rifts between Turkish and Kurdish feminists.10 Our article 
will investigate whether and how the context of heightened conflict, state violence, general 
political repression and authoritarianism, and a shift towards a more conservative gender regime 
as a consequence of changing state discourse and policies might have impacted on Turkish 
feminists’ perceptions of and relations with Kurdish women’s rights activism. 
The article is emerging out of our wider project about the Kurdish women’s movement and 
intersections between peace and feminist activism in Turkey. We have engaged in qualitative 
research amongst Kurdish and Turkish feminist activists in Istanbul, Diyarbakır, as well as 
London and Berlin between September 2015 and February 2018, a period during which 
particularly Kurdish regions in Turkey faced intense conditions of war and conflict. This time 
was also characterized by a significant increase in government authoritarianism and repression, 
involving the persecution and arrest of many activists, journalists, academics and opposition 
politicians. Our research for this article involved informal interviews with 37 Kurdish and 28 
Turkish women activists, as well as 6 focus group discussions and participant observations in 
our different fieldwork sites. We are using pseudonyms throughout the article to protect the 
anonymity of our respondents and to avoid the risk of them becoming more vulnerable due to 
state repression and the targeting of academics and feminist activists. 
In what follows, we will be outlining some of the established insights and reflections on the 
history of Kurdish and Turkish feminist tensions and co-operations, before delving into the 
current context. We will be exploring personal and political trajectories of feminists as well as 
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a range of positions within a contemporary feminist politics that attempts to diverge from earlier 
ethnocentric attitudes and tries to be inclusive and intersectional in approach. 
 
Reconsidering Past Relations 
The vast amount of literature on feminist activism in Turkey is illustrating the range of demands 
and the emergence of different groups at distinct periods,11 generally distinguishing between 
Turkish feminism and the Kurdish women’s movement.12 Various forms of state supported 
initiatives around “the woman’s question” focused on women’s education, labor force 
participation and involvement in public life as part of the modernist and developmentalist 
undertones of the Kemalist Republic.13 Turkish feminism was initiated largely by middle and 
upper class educated, secular and Kemalist women who were rather remote from society at 
large and tended to have close relationships and connections with the state and its underlying 
ideology.14 It is only after the coup of 1980 that an independent feminist movement started to 
emerge in opposition to prevalent state feminism. Influenced by international advocacy around 
women’s rights as human rights and campaigns linked to the UN Decade for Women (1975-
1985), feminists in Turkey mainly mobilized around gender-based violence, but also women’s 
legal rights, particularly in relation to the civil and penal codes. Widespread street protests were 
followed by the establishment of several initiatives, most prominent amongst them the Purple 
Roof Women’s Shelter Foundation (Mor Çatı Kadın Sığınma Vakfı) in Istanbul initiated in 
1990, which provided shelter to women and focused on domestic violence.15 
There seems to be consensus within the wide-ranging academic literature that modernization 
and development discourses as well as narratives of Turkish unity continued to characterize 
much of Turkish feminist activism in the 1980s and 1990s, despite increasing critiques of 
Kemalism on behalf of leftist and radical feminists. Meanwhile, Kurdish and Islamic women’s 
movements increasingly critiqued Turkish mainstream feminists for being ethno-centric, class-
based and exclusionary of other identities,16 similar to the way Black and lesbian feminists 
critiqued white and heterosexual positionalities associated with the second wave Western 
feminist movement.17According to our interviews, Kurdish women’s rights activists reacted to 
and challenged what they perceived to be patronizing behavior, accusing Turkish feminists of 
behaving like a big sister –ablalık yapmak.  
From the 1990s onwards, Kurdish women activists created their own women’s associations 
and journals and started to openly critique the nationalist and militaristic character of the 
Turkish state, for example, in the feminist journal Pazartesi (Monday), Jujin, Jin u Jiyan 
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(Women’s life), and Roza.18 Later on, Kurdish women in the diaspora established separate 
women’s organizations, such as Roj Women’s Association (London) and Destan (Berlin). 
These associations have helped the Kurdish women’s movement’ to became transnational, as 
well as intersectional, cooperating not only with progressive Turkish women activists but also 
with western leftist, ethnic minority and black women’s organizations. Transnational 
campaigns included ‘Justice for Women’, ‘Stop Honor Killings’, and ‘Freedom for Öcalan’. 
Importantly, Kurdish women made links with struggles of other marginalized and oppressed 
peoples and communities, as well as progressive opposition groups in different international 
contexts, increasingly perceiving links between different claims and forms of inequalities, such 
as those linked to racism, workers’ exploitation and discriminatory attitudes towards refugees 
and asylum seekers. 
Many Kurdish women initially got politicized via the PKK and its affiliated women’s 
organizations, which grew over the past decades.19 It is beyond the scope of this article to go 
into any depth in terms of the history of Kurdish women’s rights activism, which has been 
written about eloquently by several authors. 20  Here we would like to mainly stress the 
significance of the wider Kurdish movement in generating a vibrant and outspoken Kurdish 
women’s movement, partly by enabling women’s participation in both armed and political 
struggle but also, inadvertently, by marginalizing women and displaying patriarchal attitudes 
towards gender norms, which led to gendered resistance within. Elsewhere we have discussed 
the dialectic process through which the support of Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned founder 
and leader of the PKK, has worked to create political spaces for Kurdish women, who, 
nevertheless had to struggle hard to convince their male counterparts of the importance to 
implementing gender-based equality and justice into political organizations, decision-making 
processes and every-day lives.21Moreover, as stated in the literature and based on our interviews 
with Kurdish women’s rights activists, Kurdish feminism also emerged in relation to the 
exclusionary and nationalist character of the Turkish feminist movement.22 
Increasingly since the 1990s, more and more Turkish feminists started to take the critique of 
Kurdish women seriously and began to question their own positionality and politics, 
particularly vis a vis “the Kurdish Question”. However, it became obvious that a critical 
reflection on Turkish feminists’ relationship to the conflict with Kurds entailed an interrogation 
of Turkish feminists’ relation to the Turkish state. As this feminist scholar and activist put it:  
For decades, I have worked on gender studies and have been part of Turkish 
feminism. I went to Diyarbakir, a Kurdish dominated city, for the first time in 2001. 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern 
Studies Aug 6 2018. Published version available from: https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2018.1497754 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/26334/ 
 
 6 
It was also the first time that I met with Kurdish women activists and feminists. 
Since then I have continued to work closely with different Kurdish women and have 
worked in partnership with them to campaign to prevent honour-based crimes in 
the region. I recognized that family-based violence and honour crimes are directly 
connected to state-based violence. It was the time when I, and many other Turkish 
feminists, started questioning the conservative, conformist, middle class dominated, 
Istanbul based, nation state perspective of the Turkish feminist movement. 
[…]Kurdish women have shown us that unless we recognize the masculinist 
perspective of the state and remain uncritical of the nation state, the feminist 
movement cannot achieve much and won’t extend its influence beyond its own 
circle. […] The Turkish feminist movement, especially leftist and liberal feminists, 
has learnt and is still learning many things from the Kurdish women’s movement.  
 
The view expressed above resonates with several other respondents who all agreed that the 
Kurdish women’s movement shook the Turkish state’s modernization theory from its base and 
forced Turkish feminists to reflect on their relationship to the state, to Turkishness and their 
own privileges. This shift also led to a recognition of the largely elite social class basis of the 
Turkish feminist movement that, unlike the recent Kurdish women’s movement, has been rather 
remote from wider society. 
One of the first initiatives that explicitly tried to challenge the exclusionary legacy of Turkish 
feminism by seeking and recognising difference, particularly in relation to Kurdish women’s 
positionality and struggles, was Amargi. When first established in 2001, Amargi took an 
explicitly anti-militarist stand and refused to see the Kurdish Question as a separate issue from 
sexism: “militarism and war were seen as the ultimate expressions of masculinity”.23 Hence, 
Amargi’s feminism was inherently a feminism critical of the underlying authoritarian, 
militarist, nationalist and patriarchal character of the Turkish state. Amargi initially consisted 
of a majority of Kurdish women’s rights activists close to the Kurdish movement, although one 
of its most prominent founders, Pinar Selek, was a Turkish scholar and activist critical of 
Turkish state militarism. Aside from challenging state patriarchy and violence, Amargi also 
showed solidarity with women who wanted to wear the headscarf at a time when it was banned 
by the state.  
Despite its initial commitment to diversity and inclusivity, tensions and rifts developed over 
time revolving around attitudes towards sexuality as well as diverging views towards Kurdish 
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resistance to the Turkish state. Merve H. was one of 9 people who left Amargi, in November 
2012: 
In theory, Amargi had an idea that we are all together with our differences and we 
discuss our different ideas. But in the practice, we were not able to discuss our 
differences and the group created some taboos, such as around militarism and 
violence resulting from war. We, the people who left, were not part of the Kurdish 
political movement, but the reasons were political and ideological differences. We 
were all feminists who were based in Istanbul. We published a declaration to state 
why we left the group.24 
 
According to Merve, after Pinar Selek, one of the founders of Amargi, and other Amargi 
members went to prison, the group began to disintegrate and change its position towards state 
violence. In her view, the collective started to be controlled by a group of feminists who were 
opposed to centering ethnic conflict and militarism in their struggle and privileged issues 
around domestic violence and LGBTQ rights. She argues: 
They claimed that they were against violence but they were not including people 
who face state violence or who had to defend themselves against state violence. The 
group claimed that they had a pluralistic perspective but the only ideology they 
welcomed was a liberal ideology. They did not want to even listen to other 
perspectives and ideologies. They claimed that liberalism is natural and does not 
take sides. But we know that liberal ideology takes side and it is mostly the 
hegemonic state’s side. Also, during heavy conflict and violence to not take side, to 
stay silent, is taking a side, and this side is the side of who is using the violence.  
 
Obviously there exist very different narratives and interpretations about the developments and 
tensions within Amargi. It is beyond the scope of this article to provide an in-depth analysis of 
the various positions, but what became apparent to us is the significance of evolving differences 
around the issue of state violence and the conflict with the Kurdish movement in Turkey. While 
some members felt it was their responsibility and an inherent part of their feminist politics to 
speak out against state violence in relation to Kurdish communities and activists, others felt 
unable or unwilling to criticize state violence due to their opposition to the armed resistance of 
the Kurdish movement. One contributing, even if not necessarily decisive factor, to the different 
political positionings relates to diverse entry points into feminist activism. Below we are 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern 
Studies Aug 6 2018. Published version available from: https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2018.1497754 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/26334/ 
 
 8 
exploring the personal trajectories of women who have been involved in organizations or 
initiatives that have reflected on issues of diversity, inclusivity, cooperation and peace.  
 
Personal and Political Trajectories 
A close exploration of feminist activists’ personal and political trajectories in terms of their 
involvement in feminist politics that involves the cooperation of Turkish and Kurdish activists 
reveals a range of different backgrounds, experiences and politics. Personal and family 
background, specific political experiences and relationships as well as wider national, regional 
and international political developments, influence women activists’ choices and interpretations 
of feminism. In the Turkish context, militarization, authoritarianism, the increase in Islamism 
and the rise of more conservative gender norms, as well as ethnic and political conflict, have 
shaped generations of activists. Particularly the younger generation of feminists is influenced 
by transnational feminist politics that stresses the intersections of hierarchies of power and 
inequalities on the lines of gender, ethnicity, religion, sexuality and class.25 
Although not necessarily “typical” of feminist activists’ trajectories, occasionally a close 
family background with and relationship to Turkish militarism and nationalism might trigger 
or contribute to a feminist consciousness and resistance. Seda G., a young Turkish feminist 
activist and academic, whom we met on a couple occasions in Istanbul, has been involved in 
feminist and peace activism, mainly through the Women’s Peace Initiative, is critical of state 
authoritarianism and repression, particularly in relation to Kurdish communities. We asked 
Seda for the reasons she started to get involved in feminist activism. She replied: 
There are many different reasons. First of all, I am aware that not everybody shares 
my privileged background.  So I feel I need to do something for others. My father 
was part of the military and he was a soldier. […] He witnessed so many atrocities 
and saw how local people suffered at the hands of the Turkish state. He told me that 
the Kurdish regions were like an occupied country of an enemy. He said that most 
Turks don’t know and don’t hear anything about the real situation in these parts of 
the country. Instead we only hear about the heroism of the soldiers, which is not 
true. A few years later, my father retired. He hated the military a lot after that. It 
was at that moment when my Turkish nationalist father was saying all these things 
that I realized how bad the situation was. It was a wake-up call for me to do 
something. I started to educate myself and to get involved more. But my father does 
not want me to be involved very much. He does not want me to go further and to 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern 
Studies Aug 6 2018. Published version available from: https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2018.1497754 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/26334/ 
 
 9 
get into trouble. He knows that the state can be even against their own Turkish 
people who feel sympathy for Kurds. 
 
Several of our respondents referred to their reaction against and resistance to the nationalism 
and militarism of previous generations, whether it was their parents, their extended families, or 
even earlier generations of feminists. The awareness of privilege, especially in relation to what 
is commonly referred to as “white Turk”, the descendants of prominent families in Turkey, 
seems to be a contributing motivation for several feminist activists we talked to along a liberal 
to radical spectrum. Yet, many women we interviewed experience tensions and dilemmas 
dealing with their families and loved ones who do not share their anti-nationalist and anti-
militarist political positions. 
In Diyarbakir, we met with Özlem N., who had her own problems with her family, linked to 
her involvement in a feminist NGO (KAMER). Her personal trajectory into feminist activism 
also includes a father working in the military. Only her experience was radically different as 
her father is Kurdish: 
I am the daughter of a driver who was working for the Turkish military. We were 
living in Diyarbakir because of his work. We were living in a military 
accommodation within a compound with hard barriers to the outside where Kurdish 
people live. We, that is my family, faced double barriers and challenges in the 
context of my father’s work. We were never welcomed and accepted by other 
military personnel’s families because of our Kurdish background. In the military 
compound, there was discrimination against us:  we were perceived as ‘half Turks’ 
(Yarim Turk) and ‘broken Turks’ (Kirma Turk). But we were also marginalized by 
our wider extended family members, because my father was working for the 
Turkish military. 
 
Özlem continued to explain her first encounter and involvement in the feminist organization 
called KAMER, which was initially due to financial need: 
During the 1990s, when I was 18 years old, there was heavy conflict between the 
Turkish army and PKK guerrillas I was a young university student in Diyarbakir. 
During my early university time, I discovered that there was a restaurant in 
Diyarbakir run by women for women. Later I learned that the restaurant belongs to 
KAMER and that it was by KAMER’s women. I started to work at that restaurant 
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to earn some money for my education and also to help my family. It was not because 
of any feminist conviction that I started to work at that restaurant, but out of 
financial necessity. Working closely with KAMER helped me to question many 
things. It was a learning process for my gender identity. But the conditions were not 
good during the 1990s in our region, just as it is not good today. Working for a 
feminist organization like KAMER was sufficient reason to be excluded by my 
university friends, who started to view me as a weird person. They started teasing 
me, saying that I started to hate men. That experience showed me that gender 
inequality runs very deep and is very common in our society. Some might try to 
destroy you physically, but others tease and undermine you. 
 
Discussions with friends, fellow students and lecturers during university education, the political 
involvement in non-feminist organizations or direct encounters with feminist initiatives, as with 
Özlem above, all contributed to the awakening of feminist consciousness amongst our various 
respondents. In Özlem’s case, it was not only her university friends who teased her for her 
involvement in feminist activism, but also her family who was initially taken aback by her 
growing interest and concern with gender-based equality. 
While in Diyarbakir, we talked to a third woman activist in KAMER: Ayşe T. arrived in 
1991 as a teacher after having studied in Ankara. She acknowledges that she had been brought 
up with a range of stereotypes and misconceptions about Kurds, and felt initially rather unhappy 
of having been placed in the town to work. Working in a primary school, she learnt that Kurdish 
women, although facing a range of oppressions from society and their families, are strong and 
active. She also started to recognize the various forms of discrimination and oppression Kurdish 
people have been experiencing at the hands of the state.  Her introduction to KAMER was life 
changing: 
I joined group discussions at KAMER and I learnt a lot about my own life and 
inequality I faced since my childhood, which I had perceived to be normal. I 
realized that I had limitations and that I had to obey my family’s men, whether my 
father, my uncle, my brother or my husband. We used to look down to Kurdish 
women and feel pity for them, but I have discovered that I, an educated Turkish 
woman and teacher, have faced similar problems by Turkish society, by my own 
family. Diyarbakir and Kurdish people offered a mirror for me to discover my own 
identity. I have discovered and learned that without women’s rights and full equality 
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in society, at home and at the work place, it is not possible to create sustainable 
peace in any society.  
 
Peace is a reoccurring theme amongst the women we talked to. Achieving peace appears to be 
a significant value motivating many of our respondents as we have discussed in greater depth 
elsewhere. 26  However the strategy of how to achieve peace and attitudes towards anti-
militarism vary, especially in relation to attitudes toward the Kurdish armed struggle. Some 
members of KAMER although Kurdish themselves, refers to the PKK as a ‘terrorist’ 
organization, signaling their distance to the Kurdish armed movement. Meanwhile, other 
feminists, including ethnic Turkish feminists, have a different attitude towards the PKK, 
generally recognizing its shift in strategy and political aims. Merve H. and her friend Yeshim 
G., for example, are both involved in the same Women’s Peace Initiative that Seda has been 
active in. We asked them for their political trajectory. Merve said:  
Both of our involvements started because of our feminist identity and activism. 
Peace is one of our priorities. The first feminist organization I was involved with 
was Amargi. I left Amargi on 2 November 2012 together with a group of people 
because of our disagreement of focusing on different types of violence. We believed 
that the group should have focused on anti-militarism and violence coming from 
the military conflict. But others were not sharing our view and did not want to 
discuss militarism as part of violence. We believe that within conflict, especially 
military conflict, violence against women and different minorities increases, and 
without dealing and focusing on this problem it would not be possible to understand 
and stop violence easily. 
 
It was obvious that Merve’s attitude was shaped by her knowledge of and close collaboration 
with Kurdish women activists. She has not only been to various cities in south Eastern Turkey 
but had also been involved in solidarity activism in relation to Kobane. Her friend Yeşim, a 
member of the Socialist Feminist Collective, told us:  
I am coming from another feminist collective movement. There, we did not have 
this discussion and disagreements at all. We started in 2008. Since the beginning, 
most of us have been pro peace supporters. We have been against all sorts of 
violence, including state violence. We have also found HDPs 27  approach very 
promising for peace. The state and society has not given them enough credit for 
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what they have been investing for peace. […]There is a tradition of socialist 
feminism in Turkey, which started in the late 1980s. The founder of the recent 
Istanbul feminist collective is coming from this 1980s tradition. One important 
thing about socialist feminism is to provide a space to discuss liberal, multicultural 
or radical feminism in Turkey and globally and to find out what kind of gaps they 
have left behind. Most other feminist movements have not moved away from 
materialism and capitalism. 
 
The different accounts of varying entries into feminist activism shared here only provide a small 
glimpse into the range of experiences and trajectories of feminists recognizing diversity and 
being committed to an inclusive and intersectional feminism. In what follows, we will more 
closely explore the way different activists and organizations maneuver the complex political 
landscape in Turkey in relation to the conflict and violence between the state and the Kurdish 
movement. 
 
Organizing Difference 
One feminist organization that works across different ethnicities to focus on women’s needs, 
particularly various forms of gender-based violence, is KAMER. Originally founded in 1997 in 
Diyarbakir by Nebahat Akkoç, herself a victim of state violence and repression, to address local 
needs, the organization now works in 23 provinces of South East and East Anatolia, and has 
established over 40 centres. Although initially established with a majority of Kurdish members, 
KAMER does not define itself as a Kurdish organization and stresses its independence from 
any political organization28 As Hülya F. explained to us when we talked to her in September 
2015 just after the violent crackdown on Diyarbakir and other cities in South-Eastern Turkey 
started following the elections of June: “To be independent is one of our most important values. 
The second aim is to think globally and work locally. The third aim is to work from the bottom 
up. Fourth, our aim is to work for the benefit of women and to corporate with who support us 
in this.” When pressed to explain the idea of thinking globally and working locally, Hülya 
explained that KAMER tries to establish local and transnational alliances, attempting to 
translate international standards of women’s rights with local culture.  
Consciousness-raising and awareness workshops have been crucial elements of KAMER’s 
attempt to combat gender-based violence over the years. More practical service provisions 
include an emergency helpline for victims of domestic violence as well as income generating 
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projects and non-sexist childcare centres. 29  As Arat and Altınay30  stress in their in-depth 
discussion of KAMER, the organization has cultivated transnational links and global networks 
and has been plugged into international human and women’s rights funding and advocacy 
opportunities. KAMER has increasingly become known as an NGO that provides services for 
women aside from engaging in consciousness-raising and advocacy.  
In the context of the increased conflict and violence between the Turkish state and the 
Kurdish militias in the Kurdish region, three women we talked to stressed KAMER’s 
independence and neutrality. One of the Turkish activists acknowledged the difficulty in 
keeping this position during times of heightened conflict: 
The most important thing with KAMER and my wish to work for KAMER was that 
it was an independent women’s organisation. They do not belong to any political 
ideology or private entity. Women’s problems are their only interest. But I also 
know that to have this position, during conflict, especially when there is a huge 
polarization, is very difficult.  
 
Many Kurdish and Turkish women’s rights activists we talked to during our stay in Diyarbakir 
and Istanbul where critical of KAMER’s position. Linked to the wider Kurdish movement, they 
perceived KAMER’s stated neutrality as an implicit act of taking sides with the state. These 
allegations are compounded by KAMER’s increased outreach and service provision, which our 
respondents frequently referred to as an example of NGOisation and so-called “project 
feminism”. However, Özlem justifies KAMER’s position, and explains: 
Our work is for women and we need to work closely with local authorities, mayors 
and also state representatives. If women need any help, due to medical problems or 
violence at home, then we need to work with state authorities and the police. There 
was a long time we were very comfortable, especially during peace times31, but 
again, during the conflict, especially the Kurdish movement criticizes our work 
because of working closely with state. 
 
Allegations of complicity weigh heavily on activists belonging to KAMER who are clearly 
engaged in a difficult balancing act in terms of both its diverse membership as well as its 
relations with state institutions. KAMER’s attempt to stay neutral and focus on gender-based 
violence and separate women’s issues from the violence used by the state has become 
increasingly problematic given the state’s growing authoritarianism, repression and violence. 
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At the same time, it has allowed for collaborations and interactions that would usually not be 
possible in Turkey’s complex ethnic and political context. As Arat and Altınay show: 
KAMER was able to introduce both the Kurdish nationalist Alevi women of 
Tunceli as well as the Turkish nationalist orthodox Sunni women of Elaziğ to a 
cosmopolitan feminist discourse through its awareness workshops. Women of 
Tunceli and Elaziğ who were assumed to have irreconcilable differences could then 
talk to one another overcoming intersectionally shaped ethnic, religious and 
gendered violence in their lives.32 
 
Meanwhile, the escalating violence has radicalized many Turkish feminists who were initially 
critical of the Kurdish movement. When we first talked to Seda, for example, the activist and 
academic mentioned above who is involved in the Women’s Peace Initiative, she told us in 
September 2015 in Istanbul: ‘The word peace is somehow becoming an empty signifier. You 
organize a peace rally, and then people display posters of Öcalan. It is a contradictory position. 
You revere a military leader. So are you for armed struggle or are you for peace?’ However, a 
few months later, when the conflict and violence had escalated drastically, Seda stressed in a 
follow-up interview that she had lost her reservations about the way the Kurdish political 
movement approaches and conceptualizes peace: ‘State power and oppression have 
consolidated my position and my commitment to peace.’33 
The Women’s Peace Initiative was initially founded in 2009 to ensure women’s involvement 
in peace negotiations, but since 2015 the network has played an important role in challenging 
the state’s brutal crackdown on the Kurdish region in south-Eastern Turkey, as well as resisting 
increased state repression and authoritarianism more broadly. It was obvious to us that there 
existed a range of different positions vis a vis the meaning of peace and the attitude towards 
Kurdish armed resistance. Merve, previously a member of Amargi, and now an active member 
of the Women’s Peace Initiative, makes it clear that she does not blame either the wider Kurdish 
movement nor the HDP for the escalation of conflict, and confirms her commitment to work 
for peace jointly with Kurdish women’s rights activists: 
Of course, it is important what you can prioritize and what you can leave behind. 
Different feminist activists have different views and priorities. Peace and women’s 
rights are my first priority and I would like to put my energy for the mobilization 
for peace and stopping conflict. I think that the June 2015 elections provided a 
momentum for Turkish and Kurdish people to live together, to collaborate and to 
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achieve sustainable peace. We, that is around 1000 feminists in Turkey, published 
a declaration supporting the HDP. It was the first time that there was a clear support 
and declaration from the feminist movement. It was not because the HDP is a 
feminist party, which it is not, but their approach was very close to us and it was 
for peace, diversity and equality.  
 
Seda, Merve, Yeşim and many others like them, have been risking their jobs, careers, 
reputations, connections and family relationships over the past years in their ongoing 
commitment to challenge state authoritarianism and brutality, and in their recognition that 
gender-based violence needs to be tackled intersectionally.  
 
Conclusions 
Against the historical background of state feminism, and the earlier critique of the state’s 
attempts to monopolize “the woman’s question”, often still imbued with ethnocentrism and lack 
of recognition of the structural inequalities experienced by Kurdish women, the more recent 
shifts in feminist attitudes and practices in Turkey are remarkable. While some feminists in the 
1990s started to identify themselves and other activists of different ethnic backgrounds as 
feminists in Turkey as opposed to “Turkish feminists,” the acknowledgment of the specific 
plights faced by Kurdish women goes beyond an appreciation of difference. Unlike previous 
periods when conflict escalated between the state and the Kurdish movement, e.g, during the 
1990s, and between 2005 and 2013, we could not detect a shift in emphasis away from an 
intersectional analysis and struggle to one solely focusing on patriarchy, gender-based violence 
and LGBTQ rights. Instead, our research findings indicate that in the current context of 
heightened conflict, state violence, a shift towards a more conservative gender regime and 
general political repression and authoritarianism, Turkish and Kurdish feminist activists have 
been converging in their critique of the state and patriarchy. Although there still exist many 
different emphases and interpretations of what a feminists struggle should like in today’s 
Turkey, there appears to be a large consensus that this struggle entails a critique of and 
resistance to the growing conservatism, shift to Islamism, authoritarian encroachment and 
violence of the state.  
In a context where any spaces of opposition and dissent have been shrinking following the 
June 2015 elections, and even more extremely after the failed coup of July 2016, it is feminist 
activists who have been at the forefront of creating bridges and collaborating across ethnic and 
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political lines as well as voicing their opposition to the state. While Islamic feminism was 
marginalized in the past, not only by the state but also the Kemalist-oriented secular feminist 
movement, the current government’s conservative gender policies provide a more conducive 
context for those women trying to work for increased women’s rights from within an Islamic 
framework.34 As secular political spaces are shrinking in Erdoğan’s controlled Turkey, Turkish 
secular-oriented feminists of all ethnic backgrounds are working hard to maintain and save 
political spaces, legal rights and social norms long fought for. However, it is important to 
emphasize that not all secular activists are critical of the state and not all religious ones are close 
to the AKP (Justice and Development Party) ruling the country.  
Feminism in Turkey, and even Turkish feminism, exists on abroad spectrum. In the context 
of this research, we have not talked to feminists who are close to the current Islamist 
government and those who are holding on to ethnocentric Kemalist ideas about gender equality. 
The activists we talked to exist on a continuum of liberal, progressive and socialist feminisms, 
all imbued with elements of transnational feminism that is informed by an understanding of the 
intersectional forms of oppression, marginalisations and inequalities. LGBTQ activists, 
members of the socialist collective, feminist academics, peace activists and NGO activists 
involved in consciousness-raising and welfare initiatives, all have different personal and 
political trajectories and interpretations of feminism, but they share an understanding of the 
continuum of violence in terms of militarism, state-based, gender-based and domestic violence. 
Moreover, the feminists we talked to also share a recognition of the important role that Kurdish 
women have played in forging a Kurdish women’s movement on the one side and transforming 
feminism in Turkey on the other. The transformation and influence is wide ranging and includes 
a growing awareness of the intersections of gender, ethnicity, and class-based inequalities, 
While women activists have different attitudes and relationships to the wider Kurdish 
movement, and might have also different views about tactics of that movement, especially in 
relation to armed resistance, there is a considerable recognition of achievements and respect for 
Kurdish women activists who have been struggling on many fronts for many years.  
The main source of tension, in our view, is the radically different conceptualization of and 
attitude towards sexuality, which could be subject to future research. The Kurdish women’s 
movement attempts to construct equality on the basis of “sexless militants,” activists and 
society, perceiving discussions and campaigns around sexuality as symptoms of individualism, 
liberalism and capitalism. Meanwhile, liberal and progressive feminists in Turkey frequently 
feel alienated by the tabooisation of sexuality, the emphasis on collectivity at the expense of 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern 
Studies Aug 6 2018. Published version available from: https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2018.1497754 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/26334/ 
 
 17 
individual freedom and choice and the inherent social conservatism in glorifying sexless beings. 
Without wanting to undermine or ignore the very real structural differences and positionalities 
of Kurdish and Turkish feminists, solidarity and collaboration have become integral to a 
significant part of feminist activism in Turkey. It remains to be seen how political developments 
inside Turkey, as well as regionally, will shape this dynamic relationship in the future. 
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